Mastering Globalization
New sub-states’ governance and strategies
Edited by Guy Lachapelle and Stéphane Paquin
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Paradiplomacy remains largely ignored, yet the phenomenon it symbolizes has become almost run-of-the-mill: the city of San Francisco endorses a foreign country that does not respect human rights; the Quebec Government opens a series of season of cultural events in Paris; Flemish and Walloon sub-state entities form a Belgian delegation to the World Trade Organization; the Australian states attend a United Nations conference on development and the environment within the Australian government's own UN representation; the Baden-Württemberg Land participates in overseas missions to restore peace in Bangladesh, Russia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina as well as in Burundi and Tanzania; the President of Catalonia, Jordi Pujol, meets with G-7 leaders, with the noted absence of Jean Chrétien ... 

The phenomenon of paradiplomacy is not recent. The Quebec Government, for instance, began to play a role on the international stage as early as the nineteenth century. The current paradiplomacy era, that is to say, the period extending from the early 1960s to date, is considered a distinct historic period defined in terms of growth, dynamism, and its repercussions on the international behaviour and activities of sovereign players. Some of the sizeable paradiplomatic files that we can identify include economic and commercial policy, foreign investment promotion, the attractiveness of decision-making centres, export promotion, as well as science and technology, energy, the environment, education, issues of culture, and immigration, population mobility, multilateral relations, international development and human rights. Today, players on the paradiplomatic stage are becoming similarly interested in matters of human safety.

Who can explain this stepping-up or broadening of paradiplomatic efforts, starting in the 1960s in Quebec and later in the 1980s in Europe? At this stage, it is not easy to generalize, owing to differing objectives and motivations of sub-governmental powers. By taking a broad view, however, three variables stand at the forefront of the expansion of paradiplomacy: the first, and most significant, is the nation-state crisis and globalization, the second is nationalism, and inter-nationalization processes constitute the third variable.

Globalization and the development of paradiplomacy

The advent of sub-governmental states within the dominion of international relations is linked, in part, to the nation-state crisis and to the process of economic
globalization. International reorganization at the economic level has lead to a new international division of labour: competition between sovereign powers for the acquisition of new territories has been replaced with competition between sub-government states and large metropolitan areas for the acquisition of shares in world markets.

With heightened reliance on export growth, regions and cities that can afford to do so play on the international stage if only to assist exports and attract foreign investments (Soldatos, 1993). There is a clear practical reasoning to explain the international game plan of sub-governmental units: developmental needs and economic growth.

Nowadays, regions and cities offer unlimited advantages that determine the issue of investment. They compete to acquire private investments and positioning of decision-making centers. This inventive competition promotes innovation, efficiency, collective allegiance, but it also also fosters regional and municipal conflicts within a country. In some cases, the role of regions and and municipalities overshadows that of national governments. Regions and cities claim that they are better equipped than their national capital in matters of job creation. Quebec, for example, can, on the one hand, more easily attribute subsidies than the Federal Government, which must invest equitably among various regions of the country, but on the other hand, taxation and tax cuts are played out essentially at the provincial level. The Federal Government is not indispensable. Nevertheless, it can play a partnership role in research and development.

With the advent of economic globalization, transnational corporations are playing major economic roles. Today, according to some experts, these corporations are becoming key organizers or critical instruments of world growth. In the 1999 edition of World Investment Report, it was put forward that transnational companies control 25 percent of world output and two-thirds of international trade; the final third would involve intra-enterprise business (United Nations, 1999). Sub-governmental authorities are driven to make representations to these business enterprises in order to motivate them to settle in their area or remain there. Attracting a multinational corporation to a given region may even be considered a feather in the cap of those politicians responsible for this achievement.

Sub-governmental entities have means equal to their ambitions. Michael Porter has stated that multinational companies, by and large, develop interaction with a region and a city, the latter offering a favourable environment in which to expand global strategies. He also wrote:

> Internationally successful industries and industry clusters frequently concentrate in a city or region, and the bases for advantage are often intensely local while the national government has a role in upgrading industry, the role of state and local government is potentially as great or greater.  

(Porter, 1990: 622)

At the economic level, regions endeavour to attract foreign investments and the establishment of decision-making centres. They search for markets for products
of their business enterprises and target mostly technological businesses (Brown and Fry, 1993). In the case of California, Goldsborough stated:

California is so big, and its problems so immense, that it needs its own foreign policy. In an era when economics commands foreign relations, this does not mean embassies and armies, but it does mean more trade offices and state agents in foreign countries, its own relations with foreign nations and a governor and legislature willing to represent the state's interest independently of Washington.

(Goldsborough, 1993: 89)

Small and medium-sized businesses are keenly interested in sub-state policies that support the acquisition of new market shares and the advancement of exports. Contrary to larger multinational corporations, small and medium-sized enterprises do not have international resources or networks to compete in the international marketplace. While a multinational firm might negotiate directly with government officials, the same does not hold true for a small business (Strange and Stopford, 1991). In a case such as this, government intervention is desirable. In non-democratic countries such as China, the role of the politician is vital, even for multinational companies. The politician is the only person capable of expediting contact with government officials; he can facilitate the installation of a plant or the setting up of a business.

Competition to attract foreign investments is not a universal fact. Only a limited number of regions take part in the race. Each one of these regions must meet certain criteria to make them attractive to potential investors (Michalet, 1999: 47). Investors despise uncertainty; they try at all costs to limit the amount of risk involved in their investments. To keep these risks at a minimum, investors set down a number of investment prerequisites such as stability of the political and economic regime, and an efficient and impartial justice system. Potential investors may also consider other factors such as access to a broad market, quality communication, and transportation systems, the consistent success of local businesses as well as real-estate costs and availability, the price of manpower regulation, environmental policies, quality of life within the community, taxation, as well as utilities and their cost, business services and their costs, government incentives, education and training infrastructures, and proximity to suppliers and raw materials, and finally, university resources (Michalet, 1999: 85).

Governments will do their utmost to meet these criteria. In a world of limited rationality and muddled information, however, governments must also look for ways to assist investors by means of investment incentive policies. In general, government or multilateral agencies issue these policies; their techniques come under the heading of marketing. The marketing of countries, regions, or cities is a fundamental component of a territory's attractiveness. Promotional techniques play a more and more significant role and are even high on the agenda of many countries, regions or even cities. Promotional policies consist of four components: 1) the creation of an appealing image or an openness to business for the territory;
2) the implementation of services geared to potential investors; 3) a policy aimed at targeting potential investors; 4) financial inducements. Investment promotion agencies (IPA), such as *Invest-Quebec*, in Quebec or COPCA in Catalonia, underwrite these activities (Paquin, forthcoming).

Creation of a positive image is indispensable. A policy of this type is designed to correct conventional wisdom and stereotypes that tend to paint a bleak picture of the investment climate in the region. Prejudice often critically influences investment decisions. To counter the effects of a negative image, many regions will implement policies aimed at informing potential investors about the region’s advantages from an investment point of view, and to track down potential investors. We can expect a plethora of business activities such as development of Internet sites, attendance at trade fairs, and countless economic missions with politicians, business people, and members of the civil society, such as unions. The Davos summits will no doubt attract Canadian and Catalan politicians. In 2002, the Quebec Minister of Finance, Pauline Marois, declared that she had returned from a special world economic summit held in New York with contracts for the Province of Quebec worth 750 million dollars (Desrosiers, 2002). Moreover, in 1998 alone, the Quebec Government led more than 120 foreign trade missions.

Governments have also created a number of financial inducements to draw companies to their territory. For example, every year, American states and cities spend billions of dollars to attract and sustain foreign companies or companies that have come from elsewhere in the country.

Today, the United States invites the highest rate of foreign trade in the world. Foreign companies have helped create 5 million jobs in the United States (Fry, 1998). They also provide capital, technology, business management, marketing strategies, and more ... American states and cities offer foreign companies very lucrative incentives even though these companies seriously intend to set up business in the United States to compete in that country’s marketplace. From local politicians’ perspective, there can be only one winner at this game in the United States. Therefore, if financial inducements can secure, for these politicians, the establishment of a foreign business enterprise on their territory, they are prepared to engage in a battle of unhealthy competition against other American states and cities. A number of politicians believe that financial inducements are the best if not the only way in which a state or a city can achieve international recognition. Foreign high tech companies, for example, will be far more interested in locating in regions where there already exists a solid concentration of this type of business. In the United States, these regions are: Silicon Valley, Boston, and the greater New York area. In Canada, this concentration is situated in Montreal. Other regions hoping to form an industrial cluster may be tempted to resort to substantial inducements, which, it is believed, will make all the difference. A Montana politician expressed it very well in these words: “Montana and Wyoming might as well be on a different planet as far as the Japanese are concerned” (Fry, 1998: 66).

A number of regions such as Quebec, Catalonia, and Flanders are also attempting to set up a development model based on a partnership between the
government, its economic agencies, and the private sector. This particular strategy, inspired by neocorporatism, is reinforced by a culture and a political project designed for region- and nation-building. While policies of yore intended to ensure that the citizens retain control over their economy were linked to protectionism, today they are integrated into an overall plan to include the region in international markets (Balthazar, 1991). The most advanced model, according to Michael Keating, is the Quebec model known as the modèle du Québec inc. Quebec companies benefit from a number of advantages that enable them to meet and deal with the challenges of globalization simply by tapping the creative potential of social consultation. This same policy is in effect in Flanders and in Catalonia. One of its basic tenets is international policy-making (Keating, 1999).

Sub-state governments also frequently make international loan requests to help consolidate their region's economic development. Major hydroelectric projects in Quebec have had financial backing from Wall Street. The amount of the loans requires Quebec Government officials to travel to New York on a daily basis to put investors' minds at rest. These days, cities and regions act in the same manner as any other country when the time comes to make international loans. The cost of borrowing today is set on an international rate based on bond and credit markets. Cable suggested: "Regions today differ from countries only in ways that are quite subtle" (Hocking, 1999: 20).

Cross-frontier regions also set up transboundary policies in order to lay out communication infrastructures as well as road network infrastructures. The Quebec Government and the State of New York will agree to improve commercial trade along the North–South corridor. There is even talk of building a high-speed train system. There are approximately 20 commercial trade corridors at present between Canada and the US. They were created between Canadian provinces and American States following ratification of the Free Trade Agreement and the growth of North–South transfrontier trade. The Catalan government also encouraged this policy formula with French transboundary regions. We will soon see high-speed trains zooming to Barcelona. A few short hours separate the Catalan city from such commercial trade centers as Montpellier, Lyon, and Paris.

Issues of competitiveness, the development of "super regions" and transnational strategic alliances show signs of globalization; this, in turn, enhances the role that regions play. Strategies of transborder cooperation such as Quatre moteurs pour l'Europe help to fuel the dissemination of knowledge, principally at the technological and scientific levels. This type of alliance has fostered a redefinition of space for regions and cities involved in a global economy. These same cities or regions choose their strategies based more on challenges that stem from globalization than on the diktats of a domestic economy.

In a world where transportation costs keep declining, regions and cities will strive to promote their respective tourist attractions. Before 9/11, tourist revenues were at an all-time high. Within a span of 40 years, tourist journeys have gone from 25 million to 592 million up to 1996. A number of studies indicate that one job in nine depends on the aviation and tourism industries (Fry, 1998: 31). In the United States alone, tourists poured at least $90 billion into American coffers in
1996. For its part, France remains the overall winner: the number of visitors to this country regularly exceeds its population. Céline Dion and Jacques Villeneuve may be asked to advertise the Province of Quebec south of the border and across the Atlantic.

All of the above-mentioned international activities have been streamlined by the development of information technology, which facilitates the installation of international networks. The Internet is a simple and efficient tool for promoting tourism or investments in cities or regions. "TradePort," an Internet site from California, offers local businesses over 10,000 pages of research along with thousands of company reports in over 120 countries, as well as database figures on international trade, interactive tools to further exports, and, finally, a list of 40,000 California-based businesses, each identified according its field of expertise (Fry, 1998: 48).

Nationalism and paradiplomacy

Nationalism is no doubt one of the most significant variables, yet it remains one of the most neglected in relation to the study of paradiplomacy. Minority nations that plan international strategies within multicultural states are a well-known and quite common phenomenon. The most active sub-state powers in the field of international relations (Flanders, Walloonie Quebec, Catalonia, the Basque Homeland) all share a single attribute: nationalism.

Nation-building policies are elemental to any nationalist project. To achieve this goal, many sub-state leaders will map out international strategies. Regions with their own culture and a distinct language are liable to venture onto the international chessboard to search for resources or support that are unavailable to them on their own soil. This is especially the case when players in the middle of the board resist the requests for cultural protection and recognition of their nation. Quebec was quick to draft a series of cooperation policies (student and teacher exchange, alternated first ministers' meetings, import of development models and public-service institutions, such as the Caisse de dépôt et de placement) with France and other francophone nations to help strengthen the French language as well as the Quebec nation. In light of the political situation in its province, the Quebec Government enlisted the support of France in 1980 and again in 1995 in case of a victory for sovereignty. The government of Quebec also petitioned the United States for financial aid in its work to develop the state of Quebec. As noted, the province's hydroelectric projects were built, for the most part, with Wall Street funds. At one time, Canadian immigration came under a federal policy of assimilation of francophones, particularly in the West. As a result of these actions, the Quebec Government pressured its federal counterpart into allowing Quebec to select its immigrants on its own.

The underlying objective of any nation seeking its identity is recognition. This need for recognition and legitimization would explain why the development of paradiplomacy by sub-state nationalist movements remains an indispensable priority. It also explains why these same nationalist movements often develop a
more forceful paradiplomatic position. For instance, at the time of the 1992 Olympic Games, the Catalan government paid for special advertising that read: “Where is Barcelona?” The aim of this advertising strategy was to inform the population that Barcelona is in Catalonia, not in Spain. Two years later, in 1994, the Catalonia Generalitat took out a full-page ad in the New York Times, on which a large dot is drawn to represent Barcelona. The following question appears below: “In what country would you draw this dot?” The answer appears a few pages further on:

Catalonia is a country in Spain with its own culture, its own language and its own identity ... a country in which a large number of foreign companies have invested and continue to do so ... a country that hosted the Olympic Games in its Capital City.

(Barber, 1996: 176)

Later, another advertising campaign spread appeared in Newsweek; it amalgamated the Catalan culture, that of Dali, Miro and Pablo Casals with a description of multinational companies using the following publicity slogan: “Catalonia, a modern-day country with centuries of tradition” (Barber, 1996: 176). The Catalan government actively promotes the Catalan language in university faculties of Spanish as well as in foreign academies and it has been recognized as a European language.

Flanders’s foreign policy, under the guidance of its former Minister-President, Luc Van den Brande, was to put this region on the international map. It also wants the world at large to acknowledge the Belgian federal system from a foreign policy standpoint as well as being made aware of alternatives for a Flemish foreign policy (Massard-Pierard, 1999: 715). Public relations and diplomacy were closely linked to one another, and Flanders had yet to define and shape its role as a player on the international scene. Therefore, Mr Van den Brande took a series of initiatives to enhance the image of his country (Van den Brande, 1995; Criekemans and Salomonson, 2000). He formulated a policy to emphasize the concept of “economic culture” or “cultural economy” through which he attempted to place Flanders on the European political map, primarily by setting up an international foundation known as “l’Europe des cultures 2002,” by launching l’Assemblée des Régions de l’Europe, and by nominating cultural ambassadors (Keating, 2000: 3). All foreign relations vehicles (political, cultural, economic with elements of foreign trade and foreign investments, and development cooperation) were settled solely on the shoulders of the Minister-President. This brand image was used as an instrument to reach fundamental objectives. It was mainly the distinctly arrogant, anti-Walloon feature of such a policy, however, that left a strong impression on the public as well as on the media. The present government regime has chosen a more consensual domestic policy and an open dialogue between the Flemish and the Walloons.

In Europe, regions that boast distinctive cultural identities will insist that the state and government institutions promote minority languages and cultures. A
great deal of lobbying has been done with European Union, the Council of Europe, and UNESCO institutions. Sub-state nations also wish to actively promote the cultural exception clause found in regional and global economic liberalization treaties. In 2002, the Quebec Government convinced participants of the World Social Forum held at Porto Alegre to adopt a proposal aimed at creating an international instrument to protect and promote cultural diversity (Dutrisac, 2002). This “Quebec Amendment” suggests that cultural diversity should be managed by a binding international instrument, which would allow for the “elimination of principles of liberalization and mercantilism from culture.”

International projection can also be a strategy on the part of entrepreneurs seeking an identity to reinforce the feeling of identity-search on the domestic front. Positioning a regional leader in an international perspective can have the effect of enhancing the leader’s image and prestige. Jordi Pujol does well at this game. The international strategies of the President of Catalonia are rooted in a public relations policy in which the President alone embodies the entire Catalan nation. With such international prestige, Jordi Pujol is in a strong bargaining position when the time comes to negotiate with the central authority.

Theoretically, international relations are the stuff of sovereign nations. The symbolism is infinite; the player achieving international status can attend meetings with great leaders of the world. The prospect is very appealing for entrepreneurs seeking an identity (Lecours and Moreno, 2001: 4). The establishment of strong bilateral relations with a sovereign country such as France is equally essential. Quebec, as a sub-state entity, maintains better relations with France than Canada, as a country, sustains with Great Britain. General De Gaulle’s infamous speech of 1967 altered the psychology of the nation in Quebec.

Another distinctive element of nationalism is a definition of a nation’s needs or interests. When regions maintain international relations, they are required to identify a “national interest” that may come into conflict with that of the central state. For example, Scots are more in favour of European integration than their neighbours to the south. In a vote on the introduction of the euro, the Scottish population may tip the scales. In Canada, the Quebec political parties’ unanimous endorsement of NAFTA facilitated its ratification; this unleashed a great deal of opposition in the rest of the country. The culture and definition of the national interest have a bearing on the choice of negotiators. While developing strong ties with the French Government, the Government of Quebec will force the Canadian Government to include the hexagonal factor in its international priorities. Conversely, the Flemish Government will promote solid bilateral linkage with the Netherlands and South Africa, because of its cultural affinities with these countries. Flanders is even looking to develop permanent anchor points in Dutch embassies based on the model of foreign cultural centres. The objective is to create a type of Dutch-Flemish house that encourages the dissemination of culture throughout both countries. In return, they will contest the granting of credits to act in Africa in French spheres of influence.

The development of paradiplomacy is also a power struggle between sub-state nationalist movements and players on centre stage. The attitude of central
governments relative to the intrusion of sub-state nationalist movements into the private preserve of their foreign policy and the country's foreign representation is, from the offset, basically negative. Loss of monopoly gives central governments cause to perceive a great danger for the nation's foreign image. It is important to remember that players in the middle are also nationalists. The hostile attitude of central governments allows entrepreneurs seeking an identity to carry out social mobilization against the centre's argument over a policy of supremacy. Because foreign policy is perceived as a domain reserved to the state, the development of paradiplomacy becomes, in this context, a struggle for power and legitimacy (Lecours and Moreno, 2001: 5).

Regions, particularly those with a distinctive identity, may also aspire to use their diaspora on foreign soil to enhance their political clout and gather resources. The Irish diaspora has played a significant role on numerous occasions in the Northern Ireland conflict as well as in the political process. The diaspora of the Basque in America provides forums for the Basque movement. Basques have set up 130 cultural centres throughout the world (Lecours and Moreno, 2001: 16), which serve to promote not only Basque culture but also its nation. They have recently begun to use their paradiplomacy to offset the negative image that has plagued them outside their country for more than 25 years.

In other cases, a number of minorities may enlist the aid of their motherland to support their political projects or their social, economic and political growth. The case of Quebec–France relations is a case in point. Chicanos from the southern United States along with Latin Americans throughout the country are turning more and more to Mexico and other Latin American states for acknowledgement in their country. Minorities in Central Europe are also looking for support and assistance from their motherland in times of conflict or persecution. Policies have been enacted to reconstruct the networks that existed in the past.

A number of minorities, such as Afro-Americans in the United States or Native people in Canada, have developed international strategies to put pressure on their respective countries in order to be guaranteed certain rights or to achieve their claims. The international public domain will be focused on the dramatic, media-enhanced Native people's demonstrations. When the Haida people paddled a war canoe up the River Seine in Paris in 1989 to protest the wrongful appropriation of the Queen Charlotte Islands by big industry and the Government of British Columbia, the message spread throughout the world, as did the images of Mohawks besieged by the Canadian armed forces in 1990. Events of this type have helped publicize Native claims throughout the world (Forest and Rodon, 1995: 48).

Additionally, Native people insist on the intervention of international public figures or institutions in Canada's internal politics. In 1983 and again in 1987, Dene-Métis from the Northwest Territories petitioned for the intervention of His Holiness the Pope, and they were successful. In 1990, the Cree Indians of Northern Ontario requested that Bishop Desmond Tutu acknowledge the impact of apartheid on people of Native ancestry. These same people also called upon the United Nations and the European Parliament for support.
The internationalization process and paradiplomacy

Issues of international politics have been long dominated by themes that have little to do with the field of competence of sub-state entities. International relations have mainly to do with problems of war and peace, trade matters, or issues of monetary stability. The large arenas of international politics seldom stop to question sub-state entities directly. Since the 1960s, environmental issues, public health, communication, social services, transportation items, disputes over land use planning, and cultural issues, are all fields that usually fall under the jurisdiction of federal sub-state states or that of states with a decentralized organization are more and more troubled by limitations of the new international arena. Relations between central and sub-state governments are chiefly bothered by structural changes at the regional and international levels. Civil servants and politicians from sub-state entities worry about the fact that international issues affect their fields of jurisdiction. Sub-national entities will thus set up international positions for themselves because their failure to act would have given central governments a free hand.

A typical example of this kind of phenomenon is the signature of the GATT Treaty as well as the Uruguay Round trade agreements that led to the foundation of the WTO. These treaties contain provisions that have substantial effects on the fields of jurisdiction of sub-state entities. These same treaties oblige governments to respect new international trade and investment standards. A number of environmental and banking practices, in the insurance or health policy sectors, will also be subjected to these new rules. Central governments will be directed to subject sub-state entities to these accords even though they might not always have the constitutional capability to do so. Quebec, as well as Ontario and Alberta have repeatedly been involved in countervailing duty lawsuits initiated against them by the United States. A large number of provincial grant programmes have had to be modified owing to the consequences of internationalization.

The FTA (Canada-US Free Trade Agreement) as well as the NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) are subject to the same logic. In fact, a number of provisions of the FTA and the NAFTA require that provincial governments make adjustments to their statutes. This situation has led the Ontario government, which was against ratification of the NAFTA, to envisage the possibility of challenging the constitutionality of the NAFTA before Canadian tribunals. The Ontario government led by Bill Davis determined with reason that the NAFTA cuts across provincial jurisdiction in matters of labor, the environment, services, and financial institutions. The GATT agreements of 1947 and the NAFTA of 1994 have had a significant impact on provincial jurisdictions and the balance of powers, because these treaties presuppose a more powerful federal government to enact these agreements. Thus, these treaties have had major impact on Canada's internal constitutional order (Gosselin and Mace, 1996: 61).

The European integration process actualizes this reality more glaringly. European countries generally acted according to a central state's logical process when came the time to agree on the adoption of international policies. Not only
did they have the corner on the definition of “national interest,” but they alone resolved their country’s positions before the European Community. Some countries adopted more or less formal ad hoc consultations; very little machinery, however, had been institutionalized. Nevertheless, European states’ policies have a significant bearing on the fields of jurisdiction of sub-state players. In some cases, these policies even worked to add force to the central government’s power over the regions. Let us look at the cohesion fund created by the Maastricht Treaty. Among other things, the objective of this fund is to give financial support to infrastructures and to determine policies regarding environmental issues. Following signature of a treaty, which involves a transfer of sovereignty from the sub-state entity to the federal state, the state now boasts greater authority than the regions to implement a policy in that region and override the sub-state entity’s fields of jurisdiction. As a consequence of European integration, we are thus witnessing a growing centralization of countries in Europe.

To undermine this irrefutable fact, many regions will pressure their “national” government and European institutions into allowing regions of Europe to play a greater role. Sub-state entities are actually more and more active within certain institutions as well as in the decision-making process of European policies. Over the last few years, sub-state entities have become involved in five means of representation of regional interests (Hooghe and Marks, 1996: 73). These conduits are:

1. The regions’ committee;
2. The Cabinet;
3. Relations with the Commission;
4. Regional representation in Brussels;
5. Regional transnational associations.

Sub-state entities do not limit themselves solely to direct interventions with European institutions. Their position within a sovereign state also gives them access to the powers that be in the central government, which includes that country’s foreign policy players. Unlike other NGOs, these sub-state entities may actually gain privileged access to international diplomatic networks and may take part in international negotiation as well. Many European regions arrange to be given a role to play by their central state as regards European policies; such is the case in Belgium, Germany, Austria, Spain and Italy.

Conclusion

To all intents and purposes the paradiplomatic phenomenon is inconsistent. It has always been stronger in federal regimes or in a decentralized structure, that is to say in the regimes in which sub-state entities have many political responsibilities. For instance, self-governing Spanish communities are more active than their French counterparts. There is also a great difference between regions in a single country: Quebec, for instance, is definitely more active than Ontario.
At the level of sub-state entities, the development of a foreign policy is predicated upon the personality of the politicians. As Richard Balme stated, when writing about the role of political entrepreneurs in regional cooperation process:

These partnerships are often carried to baptismal fonts by prominent regional leaders: O. Guichard, and prior to becoming Prime Minister, J.-P. Raffarin on the Atlantic front, L. Spâth en Bavière, J. Pujol in Catalonia, to name but a few. Leadership accounts for the determinations of regional representative action.

(Balme, 1996: 29, our translation)

One of the first political deeds of Raymond Barre upon becoming Mayor of Lyon was to convince his colleagues from St-Étienne and Grenoble to implement a common paradiplomacy for the entire region. The city of Lyon has nine foreign representations, including one in Hong Kong and another in Montreal. Without the intervention of Raymond Barre, it is unlikely that such steps would have been taken. After all, the type of political regime as well as the personality of decision-makers can strongly influence the strength of a region’s paradiplomacy.

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